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The study of African political initiatives in South Africa has been influenced, in 
greater or lesser degree, by the historiography of African nationalism in the rest of 
Africa. With a growing radicalism in this historiography as it reflects the era of 
post-colonial pessimism in "developmentn and "nation-buildingw, looking instead 
towards a theory of 'lunderdevelopment", it is not surprising that a number of writers l 
have begun a cautious reassessment of the meaning of nationalism in South Africa. As 
this reassessment develops, it is probable that there will be a strong focus on the 
exact significance that can be attached to the group of ideas denoted by the term 
"nationalism" and how and in what way this ideological construct develops out of, and I 
acts back on, the underlying stream of political consciousness within the African 1 
population. Such an approach contrasts markedly with the earlier "Whig interpretationn l 
of African nationalism in South Africa by such writers as Leo Kuper and Peter Walshe, 
who have tended to read back into African political history in South Africa a 
nationalist interpretation developed at a much later date. (1) 
I 
Contemporary liberation struggles in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, on 
the other hand, continue to exert a powerful influence on the historiography of the 
region, and the symbolic appeal of national identity is such that it is highly unlikely 
that the historical reassessment of nationalism could go in quite the same direction 
as it has in other parts of Africa. To this extent, it is not immediately conceivable 
that many writers would share the view of Issa Shivji that there has not been a genuine 
nationalism in Africa because the structures of economic dependence left the struggle 
for national independence in the hands of a petty bourgeois elite whose "slogans of 
nationalism, freedom, equality, etc. ... were merely echoes of the ideology of the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie without their social or economic contentN. (2) Such a view 
reduces nationalism in Africa to a mere charade perpetrated by various petty bourgeois 
interests (or, as Richard Rathbone would have them, ~businessmenw) (3) in order to 
seek state power for their particular political or economic interests. This view, 
which can be christened the "conspiratorial" view of African nationalism, places little 
emphasis on the symbolic appeal of nationalism at a mass level and the various 
mechanisms by which cultural symbols are taken and redefined in order to acquire 
political saliency as nationalist ideology. (4) While it is clearly necessary to 
locate the socio-economic basis of a nationalist movement, it is also essential to 
explain how and in what manner it acquires ideological hegemoq in order to take over 
state power. 
In this respect, the recent work of Mahmood Man- on Uganda proves of 
immense interest since, while making as thorn- a class analysis of Uganda as Shivji 
does of Tanzania, he argues that there are precise class configurations which 
necessitate a nationalist rather than a tribalist political organization. (5) The 
distinction is based upon the argument that "in the commodity-producing regions of the 
country, where there were significant kulak formations, political organization took a 
predominantly tribal expressionll (6), while, on the other hand, "where kulak fomtions 
were absent but comodity production was carried on by peasant farmers, traders 
provided the political leadership for organizations that were nationalist in 
orientation" (7) (emphasis in original). The reason for this is that kulak interests 
tend to be regionally defined and thus readily lend themselves to tribalist ideologies, 
thus reinforcing what a non-Marxist writer like John Duncan Powell would call a 
"~lientelist~~ model of politics (8), while trading interests among the petty 
bourgeoisie tend (as in the case of Afrikaner nationalism) to be on the scale of the 
nation-state since they directly conflict with the demands of international capital. 
This distinction can be illuminated in the case of African political 
organization in South Africa, with a marked shift in the politics of tribalism towards 
one of a national dimension in the period of the fight to defend the Cape African 
franchise. Thou& the issues involved all four provinces of the Union, this paper can 
only focus on the Cape and the Transvaal, which represent, in a very general manner, 
the corner-stones for the two types of political organization under scrutiny. The Cape, 
in fact, with its longer tradition of direct involvement in government through the 
African franchise, represented the interests of the Eastern Cape kulaks under 
D. D. T. Jabavu and the Cape Native Voters Association. The Transvaal, on the other 
hand, though also sensitive to the issues of land rights and the interests of peasants, 
lacked strong kulak political leadership since this, as in the Orange Free State, had 
been severely attacked by the 1913 Land Act. Much more importantly, as this paper 
seeks to show, the Transvaal became the province where the urban trading interests 
among the African petty bourgeoisie were able to organize, centred as they were on the 
Rand. This latter group, loosely organized until the early 1930s, were able to take 
over political hegemony in African political organization once the basis for the Cape 
political hegemony had been destroyed by the l936 Representation of Natives Act, which 
put the African voters in the Cape on a separate roll. The leader of the trading 
interests was to emerge in the 1940s as Dr Xuma, President of the ANC from 1940 to 1949. 
The significance of the Cape African franchise, therefore, extended beyond 
the issue of mere political symbolism, which has been the interpretation attached to 
it by some liberal historians. Though it may be true, as Peter Walshe has pointed out, 
that "the Hertzog Bills became the central stimulus in African political tho@tl1 (9), 
it is necessary to see in what manner this change in political thinking reflected a 
transformed set of social structures in which the African elite operated. Though all 
African leadership in South Africa worked within the constraints of "dependencyt1, 
these were by no means static. Thus the leverage exerted by the Cape African elite 
was lost t h r o w  the 1936 legislation and new avenues had to be sought: it was this 
that was to be the stimulus towards a g r o w i n g  nationalist consciousness that was to 
grow up under Xwna's leadership after 1940. 
It could, of course, be argued that the fight to defend the Cape African 
franchise came only after a series of much earlier issues which had also served to 
unite African political leadership on a national basis. The very formation of the 
South African Native National Congress in 1912, for instance, came only a year before 
the attack on African land tenure via the Natives Land Act of 1913. Similarly, there 
had been the post-war campaign in 1919, followed by the issue of urban areas 
segregation in 1923. All these issues and others had undoubtedly played a significant 
role in helping to bring the African political elite together in South Africa to resist 
attacks by an increasingly coercive state dominated, by an alliance of mining capital 
and agriculture. (10) But, on the other hand, this ostensible unity remained tenuous 
before the publication of the four bills by the Pact Government in 1926, which included 
two on land and the franchise. (11) In terms of the ANC, for example, divisions had 
continually occurred to reflect the continued saliency of "tribalr1 and regional 
divisions among the kulak elite,which tended to have a dominating SW in the 
organization. After 1917, for instance, there had been continual divisions between 
the Transvaal and Natal after John Dube resigned as president over the issue of land 
segregation. (12) Similarly, in the Cape in the l92Os, llProfessor" James Thaele had 
espoused a version of Garveyist ideology as president of the Cape African Congress, 
whilst at the same time editing a paper, The African World: but such a political 
stance had also admirably suited certain business ventures, including a proposed land 
company which Thaele had sought to establish in partnership with S. M. Bennett Ncwa;na.(l3) 
After this had failed, Thaele eventually vanished with the funds of the Cape African 
Cong'ress derived from the sale of the Congress Hall in Cape Town. (14) 
In this context, it was not surprising that many of the ANCls urban 
intelligentsia and aspirant trading class were beginning to despair of seeing unity in 
the organization. Thus, when in 1928 the controversial Josiah Gumede became President 
of the ANC, Selby Msimang was to write despondently that nothing was being done to 
counteract the four Native Bills. "Except for pious resolutions passed at meetings 
here and there", he wrote, "nothing is being done to mobilise the whole force of Bantu 
public opinion to protest against the most iniquitous provisions of some of them." (15) 
Little was to be done in the next few years either, mainly because of severe 
ideological disputes in the ANC as Gumede tried to draw the movement closer to the ICU 
after his return from the Brussels meeting of the League Against Imperialism in 1928 
and his visit to the Soviet Union. (16) Eventually, Gumede was to be removed from the 
presidency in 1930 and replaced by the reactionary Pixley Seme, who tried to restore 
the ANC's organization through strengthening the Upper House of Chiefs, whom he saw as 
being potentially the basis for economic regeneration of the Africans through the 
fostering of trade concerns. (17) But the growing urban African petty bourgeois 
leadership was dissatisfied with Semels efforts also. By 1931, there were various 
efforts on the part of the disaffected elements in the ANC to start trying to reorganize 
African political leadership. A "Unity Movement1' was founded in the Orange Free State 
by Selby Msimang with R. A. Sello and Keable IMote, which complained of lack of loyalty 
to the ANC which, it now declared, consisted of six separate parts. (18) This 
disaffection was to persist throughout the early 1930s but was unable to challenge 
Semels leadership of the ANC with any great effect, principally through the general 
weakness of any African political initiatives at the height of the economic depression. 
But the groundswell of opposition remained, and indicates that an urban intelligentsia 
was seeking to transform an organization which was seen as politically outmoded. "It 
has to be admitted", Selby Msimang argued at the end of 1933, "that the African 
National Congress has never at any time considered economic problems. As an 
organisation it had the misfortune at its very inception to meet with a bait thrown by 
the government of the day in the form of the Natives land Bill in consequence of which 
a Union-wide agitation began. From that time onward the leaders opposed any leader 
who attempted to draw attention to bread and butter politics ... Congress had no time 
for a more progressive policy established on the principles of self help and self 
development, for its whole weight was thrown against laws and government policies 
generally acknowledged to be inimical to African progress." (19) 
This weakness of the urban intelligentsia related in a very strong way to the 
failure of the African petty bourgeoisie in the urban areas to acquire an independent 
economic base. The reasons for this 1~ in a variety of factors: the migrant labour 
system and the absence of a stable and secure urban black population through which to 
mobilize capital (a problem which did not hamper Afrikaner capitalism) (20), 
restrictions on the access by African businessmen to credit facilities and the low 
level of entrepreneurial skills which was reinforced by a mission-dominated education 
system that encouraged "industrial training" for either farming or semi-skilled 
industrial jobs. The implications of this, though, were to be profound politically. 
The absence of an independent economic base made the creation of an independent black 
press well-nigh impossible. There were attempts to run African newspapers in the early 
1930s, but these were short-lived. Pixley Semefs Ikwezi le Afrika was taken over by 
The African Leader, which emerged after the collapse of the ANC-owned Abantu Batho in 
1931. The Leader's editor was T. D. Mweli-Skota, who had various projects for the 
establishment of African businesses, none of which came to fruition. But the 
depression made running a newspaper very difficult, and, with the establishment of 
The Bantu World in 1932 by white commercial capital, the African Leader faced strong 
economic competition and it collapsed by 1934. (21) 
The important point about these economic failures of the African petty 
bourgeoisie was that they were to drive them into political dependency on white liberal 
organizations. To some extent, this had already occurred long before the early 1930s, 
since the Johannesburg Joint Council had been formed in 1921, a year after the African 
Miners' Strike, at the same time as the Chamber of Mines-owned Umteteli wa Bantu. 
Many African opinion leaders had been forced to write through Umtetelils columns for 
want of any other medium, and both Selby Msimang and R. V. Selope Thema were to be 
active, too, in Joint Coxncil circles which represented the only available channel for 
the African elite's political aspirations in the absence of an independent economic 
power-base. This dependence on liberal organizations was, however, to be increased 
after 1929, with the foundation of the South African Institute of Race Relations, with 
funds from the Carnegie Corporation. The Lnstltute, together with the Joint Councils, 
was to become the taxget of Africanist attacks by the early 19308, since it was seen 
as depriving African political leadership of an independent basis of authority. One 
of the most prominent of these attacks was throw the columns of Umteteli w a  Bantu 
by an anonymous writer called llEnquirerll. Suggested by some to be Harold Hbelle, who 
was the brotherin-law of Sol Plaatje (22), llEhquirerlsfhetrtcles did represent a 
powerful case for African political leaders to free themselves from Joint Council 
domination,and the influence of his articles m w  well have contributed to the later 
cleavage between the ANC under Xuma and the Institute in the early 1940s. As 
'%nquirerll wrote in 1933: l. the Natives have been helpless victim of all sorts of 
exploitation by European individuals and European bodies or groups. The Joint Council 
movement ... is one intended to be established as the only agency or medium through 
which the Natives could air their grievances or make their representations to the 
Government or local authorities concerned. Ln working towar& this objective this 
movement has, directly or indirectly, destroyed or rendered ineffective all purely 
African organizations, and has arrogated to itself the right to control and direct 
all matters Bantu.ll (23) While such an argument was couched in the language of a 
conspiracy theory, undoubtedly l%nquirerf~~~ articles did have quite a powerful impact. 
Selby Msimang, caught in a difficult intermediate position, was stung into claiming 
that l1Ehquirerl1 was llsuf ering from helplessness and an inferiority complexll (24), 
while the Institute of Race Relations commissioned Edgar Brookes to tour several areas 
to sound out opinion ~n~%nquirer's~~a.rticles (he found that they received little 
support). (25) 
But l1Enquirer'sl1 arguments did, nevertheless, represent a potential 
ideological basis for a growing urban ethnic consciousness which would have been able 
to expand if it had been able to acquire an economic base for itself. In 1934, for 
exemple, l1Ehquirerl1 attacked tribal rule and argued for the emergence of a new set of 
values in the urban context. 
... tribalism is fast decaying. It cannot be otherwise: 
the various administrations of the country are European, 
education, c h m h  work, the impact of European civilisation, 
the desire on our part to establish ourselves economically, 
which fact alone endangers individualism, are all powerful 
factors which operate against tribal rule or administrative 
tribalism as distinct from social tribalism. The latter is 
the make-up of the whole fabric of the African code of 
social life and traditions. Education, Christianity and 
civilisation have no baneful effect on it, but, on the 
contrary, strengthen it. I even go so far as to say there 
is, in the light of our social life as a people, no such 
thing as 'detribalised Natives f . (26) 
Such a perspective contrasted markedly with the integrationist assumptions 
of most of the African political leadership, influenced as it so often was by liberal 
ideology from the Cape. (27) But the very fact that "Ehquirerl' wrote under a 
pseudonym weakened his influence (28), combined with the fact that there was no 
coherent political organization in the northern Province to promote his arguments. 
Indeed, the dominant theme after the publication of the four Hertzog Ells 
in 1926 is the growth of effective political organization in the Cape, which was to 
overshadow other parts of the Union. While the Cape ANC under Thaele remained divided 
throu&out the l92Os, Jabavu had sought to organize resistance to any proposed Native 
legislation on the basis of the Cape Native Voters Convention. After 1926, in fact, 
this seemed his dominant political objective and, as he wrote to Sir Walter Stanford, 
"it is now taking us all our time to preserve our old rightsq1. (29) One of the 
initial strategies was to co-operate with other organizations in the Eastern Cape in 
order to present a united front of African demands. In February 1926, for example, a 
meeting was called in King Williamts Town by Dr Rubusana, together with D. D. T. Jabavu, 
and with B. B. Xiniwe as Secretary,to endorse the respective policy resolutions 
opposing the franchise by the Bantu Union, the Ciskei Native Voters'Convention, 
together with the Cape Native VoterslConvention. It was further resolved "that steps 
be taken to invite the executive officers of the abovementioned organisations to 
confer corporatively as to the best way of transmitting such resolutions to the 
Government under the auspices of influential delegations and otherwisell. (30) The tone 
of this resolution indicated that the objectives were the traditional ones of seeking 
to alter government policy through persuasion and petition and no tho-t was to be 
given to organizing any form of mass political base. -,at its 1928 conference, the 
Cape Native Voters Convention moved a petition to the government that llyour 
petitioners humbly submit that the solid and undivided opinion of all thinking Natives 
in the Union uncompromisingly opposes any tampering with the Cape Native 
Franchise1'. (31) It was clear in fact that the whole intention behind this strategy 
was specifically & to seek to develop any mass African opinion, since this was seen 
as playing into the hands of the Communists, particularly after the start of that 
partyts campaign from 1929 onwards to start organizing farm workers in the rural areas 
of the Cape. (32) Thus it was not surprising that at the 1929 conference of the Cape 
Native Voters~Convention Bennett Ncwana moved that the Convention 'l. resolves to 
oppose with all its power any effort on the part of the Communist Party to form 
communist communities in this country". The motion was adopted unanimously. (33) 
The exclusive nature of the African organizations in the Cape concerned to 
defend the franchise might well have rendered their influence ineffective by the end 
of the l92Os, given the growth of the ICU and the beginnings of newer industrial unions 
of African workers in the Cape in the late 1920s. (34) However, the onset of the 
depression in the early 1930s must be seen as undoubtedly aiding the fortunes of the 
Cape African elite, as the attempts at union formation met with resistance and the 
passing by Oswald Pirow of the Riotous Assemblies Act restricted the movements of 
radical activists like Ndobi and Tonjeni (though not before individual Communist 
branches were established in various lcoalities). (35) In addition, too, the split 
in the ANC led to some support being given by individual African leaders, who 
undoubtedly strengthened the Cape organizations. One of the more active of these was 
Sol Plaatje, who campaigned actively in 1928 to register African voters in the Cape 
against growing resistance from Nationalist local administrations and who became Vice 
President of the Cape Native VoterstConvention. Plaatjefs undoubtedly charismatic 
political influence, especially after the publication of his novel Mhudi in 1931 (the 
first Black novel in English in South ~frica), must be seen as giving the Convention 
an enormous fillip. In December 1931, in the year before his death, Plaatje gave the 
presidential address to the Convention and was able to show that the voter registration 
drive had been successful in that,out of 423 disqualifications, over 400 were found to 
be fraudulent and were dismissed. (36) 
To this extent, the strength of the issue to defend the Cape franchise, and 
in particular its organizational embodiment in the form of the Cape Native Voters* 
Convention, must be considered a crucial factor in Jabavuls successful outbidding of 
Pixley Seme in 1935 to head the campaign to fight the Hertzog bills. It was, in fact, 
in his capacity as President of the Cape Native Voters~Convenfion that Jabavu 
initially called the meeting in Bloemfontein in December 1935 to form the All African 
Convention. Significantly, too, his alliance with the urban elite was demonstrated 
by his proposal that the gathering meet "not at the invitation of any particular 
political organization but as guests of the Bloemfontein Local Advisory Board or some 
other local competent committee to be decided upon by the Bantu Mayor, T. M. Mapikela, 
who is acceptable to all of us concernedll. (37) This effectively nullified the 
independent authority of the African National Congress, and, though Jabavu tactfully 
suggested Seme as Chairman, he indicated that this would not be in his capacity as 
President of the ANC "but as one kindly asked by all of tm to fill this emergency 
pbsition" . (38) 
This was a clever tactical move on Jabants part, since it deprived Seme of 
any political initiative. Thou& he tried to keep the middle ground by writing of his 
pleasure at getting "the promised helpf1 from Jabavu, it was clear that the ANC by this 
time stood little chance of being able to maintain the sympathies of the urban African 
elite. (39) The success of the AAC as a national organization representing the 
African political elite in South Africa in December 1935 showed that the initiative 
had now clearly passed to Jabavu, who, by February 1936, was planning a full-time 
organizer despite the organization' S limited funds. (40) It was becoming clear, too, 
that the M C  was an organization around which the urban elite could now gather on a 
national basis. This was a departure from previously, since the ANC under Seme had 
proved that it lacked the internal cohesion necessary to articulate actively the 
interests of the urban petty bourgeoisie in alliance with the m 1  kulaks on any 
united basis. Thus, though it is true, as Peter Walshe points out, that the ANC 
right from its very establishment had a strong African middle class element (41), too 
much can be made of this in terms of actual political consciousness. The African 
petty bourgeoisie increasingly came to see the ANC as failing to live up to its 
professed aims and In need of significant internal regeneration. The failure to do 
this left the field open for the AAC to step in and appropriate the role of 
articulating a national elite consciousness. The significaace of this was, of course, 
to be profound in the long run. Now that the AAC could be seen as a national 
organization, so in turn the conception of African political strategy could be planned 
on a wider basis than the essentially provincial context of ANC politics. The 
fomerly disillusioned Selby Msimang, for example, turned to the AAC as representing 
a new possibility for African political regeneration. So, too, did other ANC 
members like Xuma, the Rev. Calata, the Rev. Z. R. -bane, and R. V. Selope Thema. 
Many of these leaders belonged to both organizations and in no way saw then as 
incompatible, while, on the other hand, some like Dr Xwna belonged to the AAC in the 
late 1930s before returning to the ANC in 1940,to become its president. 
While a detailed analysis of the All African Convention is beyond the scope 
of this paper, it can be concluded that it represented an important break with the 
previous trend in African politics. Its wide composition of different African 
political orgainizations meant a general opening up of African politics, and it 
contrasted markedly with the restricted and hierarchical nature of the AN(=, dominated 
as it was by kulak interests. The inclusion of the Communists, for example, opened up 
a wider political dialogue than previously and evinced the possibili-ty of drawing in 
some mass support; indeed, there was a gmwing consciousness amongst the African 
political elite after the passing of the 1936 legislation that a more nass-based 
political movement was necessary to bring political influence to bear on the state. 
To some extent this accrued from the dependence of the organization on funds supplied 
by the African population, for in April 1936 a Five Million Shilling Fund was 
established with the objective of getting grass-roots organizations to contribute 
funds. (42) In some cases, this actually meant going right down to a mass level in 
order to gain support. In Kroonstad, for example, a "Bantu Day" was held by the All 
African Convention, though it was dominated by Joint-Council dominated African scout 
organizations of Pathfinders and Wwfarers who staged plays in the town and the local 
location. (43) With this greater popular involvement, there developed attacks on the 
elitist nature of the proceedings of the actual Convention itself. At the second 
conference of the AAC at the end of 1936, there was criticism of the failure to bring 
the motion on the Cape franchise, which argued for no compromise, on to the floor for 
open discussion, while the procedure of nominating candidates for election under the 
1936 Act behind closed doors by the Executive Committee was also to be attacked. (44) 
Similarly, there was to be disillusionment with the actual workings of the Executive 
Codttee itself. Xuma complained, for example, that none of the motions he brought 
before the committee were discussed since "all peoples' minds were set on the 
election". (45) 
To some extent, this was not surprising. With the failure of the All 
African Convention to prevent Hertzog taking the African voters off the cornman roll 
in the Cape, the prospect of some political avenues of advancement presented by the 
establishment of the Natives Representative Council and the four Native Senators 
channelled African political agitation in a different direction. In addition, too, 
it became clear that, with the failure of the tiny liberal opposition in the House of 
Assembly to prevent the passage of the Representation of Natives Act, a new strategy 
was needed. Hofmeyr, for example, who had led the political opposition in the House 
of Assembly, was to argue by August 1936 that Cape liberalism had "tended to become 
too largely a thing of sentiment, too readily found satisfaction in warming itself 
at the fire of the old idealisms, paid too little heed to the need for finding in 
changing times a new basis for those ideal ism^'^. Re went on to argue for a "new 
liberalism" which entailed "the acceptance of, in essence, the same broad principles 
as those for which the old liberalism had stood, together with the application, to the 
working out of those principles, of sympathetic first-hand acquaintance with the 
Native peoples - or, to put it differently, eager study and thorough-going 
investigation, with a view to giving form and substance to the otherwise possibly 
dry bones of idealismtt. (46) This reformulation of liberal ideology away from the 
Cape tradition of actual African political representation towards a depoliticizing 
conception of the "native questiont1 in terns of Institute of Race Relations-orientated 
fact gathering inevitably had a powerful impact on African political consciousness in 
the late 1930s and undoubtedly contributed to the growth of a nationalist consciousness 
as the ties of political dependence with white liberals were transformed. It became 
clear, in fact, that the old patron-client relations, which had been fostered by the 
African elite in the Cape and the white liberals, could not be so easily adapted in 
the aftermath of the 1936 legislation. By November of 1936, Xuma was warning Hofmeyr 
that "your Government's policy is definitely driving us from membership of the state 
in a country we consider yours and ours. This policy establishes, with leadership of 
the State itself, what I choose to call real racialism in South Africa, from which one 
may expect very serious conflicts and antagonisms between the White and Black races in 
South Africa, unless better councils . . . prevail". (47) Hofmeyr, however, was able to 
offer little solace, seeing "no alternative to that of accepting the position thus 
created at least as a foundation on which to build a more adequate structure of race 
co-operation in the futuret\ (48) 
In these circumstances, the transformed structures of white economic and 
political hegemony after 1936 led to a growing nationalist consciousness among Africans 
on a Union-wide basis. Though regional differences were to persist into the 19408, 
especially in the Cape and Natal, the attack on the Cape franchise in 1936 provided an 
important fillip for the development of an African political elite with a set of shared 
values which was to start acquiring for itself a popular basis with the onset of the 
second world war. In this sense, therefore, it is possible to see the Cape franchise 
as pla~ring a crucial role in the development of African political consciousness and 
its growing autonomy from control and influence by white liberals. Though clientelistic 
structures and relationships of political patronage were to be important features in 
African politics in South Africa after 1936, especially via the medium of the Natives 
Representatives, they were no longer so dominant as in the era dominated by leaders 
like John Tengo Jabavu, D. D. T. Jabavu and Pixley Seme. Moreover, the destruction of 
an identifiable "liberal traditiont1 with the disappearance of the Cape African 
franchise meant that the African political leadership was to become more susceptible l 1 
to an indigenous political ideology in the form of Africanism. This ideology was to 1 
become significant in the course of the Second World War and was to find concrete 
expression, owing in some considerable measure to the symbolic significance of the 
failure of the campaign to preserve the African franchise in the Cape. 
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